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Abstract
This paper examines political favoritism of cites in national capital markets and the
effect of that favoritism on city sizes. The paper estimates the city-by-city variation in
the prices of capital across cities in China from 1998 to 2007. It relates how the prices
facing the highest order political units and overall cross-city price dispersion change with
changes in national policy and leadership. The effect of capital market favoritism on
city growth after the national relaxation of migration restrictions in the early 2000’s is
investigated. The elasticity of the city growth rate with respect to the price of capital is
estimated to be - 0.07 in the OLS approach and -0.12 in the IV approach.
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1 Introduction
Policy bias towards politically favored cities in developing countries is a major policy issue (e.g.,
Ades and Glaeser, 1995; Davis and Henderson 2003) in general as well as in specific countries such
as China (World Bank 2014). Simple theoretical models suggest that cities that are favored in national
capital markets, in export or import markets or with enhanced transport infrastructure, will attain larger
sizes than non-favored cities, increasing inequality in size distributions (Henderson, 1988; Ades and
Glaeser, 1995; Duranton, 2007). The empirical work to date has focused on special cases such as fa-
voritism of national capitals (e.g., Ades and Glaeser, 1999; Davis and Henderson 2003) or favoritism
of a national leader’s birthplace (Hodler and Raschky, 2014). For national capitals, the idea is either
that national leaders favor the place they live and their relatives may work, or that they garner key
political support from the national capital population. Favoritism of one type or another will shift
up returns to living or producing in favored cities, potentially drawing in workers and firms, with the
advantages of favoritism being dissipated by increased disamenities from increased populations. This
literature suggests that unrestrained migration can lead to gross over-population of favored cities and
the specter of poor living conditions such as congestion and urban slums. Alternatively, countries can
try to restrict in-migration to favored cities, as is China in the 1990’s and even continuing today.
In these analyses, a better articulation, let alone a political economy model of different aspects of
favoritism is lacking, beyond just favoritism or not of the national capital. And empirical evidence
on political favoritism is limited and indirect. In the literature that focuses on national capitals in
Ades and Glaeser (1995) and David and Henderson (2003), one must worry that capital cities are,
for example, often located in prime geographies and have transport links which make the capital the
main hub of the country (as opposed to some other city), in potentially an efficient hub and spoke
system. Both factors draw in high numbers of people themselves and separately identifying the effect
of political bias on size is a challenge. A second challenge is to identify degrees of bias. For example,
evidence that per capita public expenditures is higher in a capital city is not evidence of bias per se;
higher per capita expenditures in larger cities may be efficient if there are greater relative benefits of
such expenditures. Or evidence that capital to labor ratios are higher in larger capital cities is not
necessarily evidence of bias, since nominal labor costs are higher.
Keeping in mind the above challenges, we utilize the specific institutional and political setting in
China to quantify political favoritism directly, and examine its causal relationship to city sizes com-
prehensively and carefully. While the context is particular, it will inform us about analysis of other
contexts. We first articulate a basis for widespread favoritism in China where it is not just favoritism
of one or two political cities versus all others, but shifting favoritism of a wide variety of cities at the
expense of the rest, based on the specific and shifting national and local leadership structures, and in-
centives inherent in that. Second, we use data on Chinese capital markets to study political favoritism.
This has two key advantages. In general, defining bias in capital markets is more clear-cut and not
confounded with issues of city scale, unlike for analysis of differential per capita public expenditures
or capital to labor ratios. Efficiency in capital markets requires equalized marginal returns to capital
across cities, regardless of size. The second advantage in looking at capital markets in China is that
they can be the key mechanism of political favoritism: banks are still de facto state owned. The state
intervenes in capital markets in response to policy initiatives and political pressures, to potentially
favor different types of firms and cities.
The final step is to look at the effects of bias on city sizes. There is a cross-section, or long run
equilibrium model, where cities with lower costs of capital, ceteris paribus will be larger. While we
will examine such a model, estimation is challenged by all the unobservables that might drive differ-
ences in city sizes and might be related to the degree of bias, either incidentally or by design. However
again, China provides a context where we can construct an empirical framework where inferring the
effects of bias is better grounded. We examine the effects of bias on population growth from 2000 to
2010, or how more favored cities grow differentially faster. Looking at growth in a specific context
arguably allows us to difference out other fundamentals that affect city sizes. China’s internal migra-
tion policies provide variation helpful to identification of effects. Prior to 2000, migration in China
was legally and sharply limited (Chan, 2010), curtailing the ability of migrants to move to locations
with better wages and job opportunities (Au and Henderson, 2006a and 2006b). Around 2000, legal
constraints on migration1 disappear, although migration still faces impediments. This context allows
us to argue that there is a regime shift with all cities facing more elastic supply curves of population
after 2000, in terms of drawing upon the national reserve of under-employed rural populations. We
develop a simple model to show that those favored cities facing a lower price of capital then are likely
to respond with larger population increases over the next decade, with the change in supply elasticity.
What do we find? By analyzing firm level data in China from 1998 to 2007, we find that, de-
pending on the year, one or two of the four highest level administrative unit cities in China (Beijing,
Tianjin, Shanghai, and Chongqing) experience a 20-40% lower price of capital than others. The mag-
nitude of differential in price is similar to the differential in favor of state over private owned firms
near the end of our time period. For these four cities, we find that the degree of bias varies overtime in
predictable ways as national leadership changes, consistent with our conceptual framework. We then
turn to our main analysis which looks at how the price of capital differs city-by-city for the whole
set of cities and how these differentials seem to be driven by changing political forces across China
as they affect local areas. Finally, we turn to the effects of these differential prices on city sizes and
growth rates. The effects on city sizes in a cross-section framework are large. But even in the growth
framework where identification is better defended, we find an elasticity on growth of about -0.124.
A one standard deviation decrease in the price of capital would increase a city’s growth rate from
2000-2010 by 4% given an average growth rate of 5%.
These findings face a variety of identification issues that we try to resolve. A city’s cost of capital
may be driven by non-political factors and capital prices are not randomly allocated across cities. We
construct relevant measures to account for varying local economic culture, differences in historical
total factor productivity [TFP], national programs promoting investment in specific sectors in which a
city has historical employment and built-up comparative advantage, and the like, to shore up our evi-
dence. For city growth analysis, in uncovering causal effects, many other factors may simultaneously
affect the cost of capital facing a city and its population growth, including other forms of favoritism
such as local infrastructure investments funded from the outside and the assignment of politically fa-
vored leaders to faster growing cities. Another issue for this growth analysis involves separating out
the positive effects on growth of lower costs of capital from the negative effects of capital market
inefficiencies such as allowing inefficient firms to be propped up and to remain in business. We make
serious attempts in circumventing these identification issues by the use of specific controls and with
two different instrument variables. However, most candidates for an instrument for capital market
favoritism are inherently likely to have direct effects on city growth, if only through affecting other
1For examples, these constraints include: taxes and fees on migration, job quotas, needing official permissions from both
the sending and receiving places.
forms of favoritism which might also affect city growth. We interpret our instrumental variable esti-
mations cautiously, discussing their validity and limitations.
The rest of the paper is organized as the following. Section 2 discusses a conceptual famework for
local favoritism in capital markets in China and reviews the existing literature and Chinese context.
In section 3, models and general econometric specifications are respectively developed for measuring
political favoritism in the capital market and its link to city growth. Section 4 details data sources
and examines how the descriptive patterns further motivate this paper. Results on capital market bias
and its effect on city growth are separately presented and discussed in Section 5. Lastly, section 6
concludes.
2 Conceptualizing urban political bias in China
2.1 Conceptualizing favoritism
Based in part on work by Li (2001, 2002, 2005, 2013), Li (2005), and Lim, Porter, Romer and
Spence (2011), how should we think about spatial favoritism in China’s capital markets? As we will
discuss in more detail below, the Communist Party has various well defined factions. People at the top
of a faction are patrons to those below within that faction. At the city level, local leaders are evaluated
on the basis of economic performance, meaning literally the local GDP growth during their tenure as
a local leader. The patrons of a local leader want to make conditions conducive to economic growth
in that city, so that leader will get a good evaluation. A simple lever is intervention in local capital
markets to ease credit for producers in that city. Next, we will discuss mechanisms for how capital
is allocated across cities, discussing, in particular, how provincial leaders influence the allocation of
capital across cities, noting that provincial leaders also appoint local leaders. The expectation is that
provincial leaders appoint people they prefer as local leaders, and in turn favor the cities governed
by their appointees. This is simply patronage politics. Of course these provincial leaders expect a
pay-back: backing within the Party by these local officials as these leaders later seek higher office
within the Party.
While this is a general framework, we note also that there is an administrative hierarchy among
cities in China: provincial level cities (Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai, and Chongqing), provincial capi-
tals and other prefectures. By place in the hierarchy, cities have different formal degrees of autonomy,
different fiscal responsibilities and resources, as well as potentially differential favoritism in the state
influenced capital allocation process. Leaders of provincial level cities are like provincial governors
and are appointed by national leaders. These leaders are relatively high up in the political hierarchy;
and as such we might expect that leaders of higher level cities are overall favored in national politics
and capital market allocations. However, as we will explain later, given the specific factions within
the party, national leaders can have allegiance to particular provincial level cities and can favor those
over others.
How is it possible for political leaders to distort capital market allocations? To answer that, we
examine the literature on the evolution of China’s banking system. The online Appendix gives more
detail but here we note key items. Despite China’s economic reforms since 1978 that successfully
freed up most output market and induced widespread growth, reforms in factor markets for labor,
capital, and land have been slow and incomplete. Banks in China today remain de facto state owned.
There have been extensive reforms over the last 20 years designed to put banks more on a market basis
and minimize the extent of non-performing loans. However, the Committee of the Chinese Commu-
nist Party retains the power to appoint the boards of directors and senior management of banks. The
state’s interest is not communicated through shareholder’s meetings but via the firm-level Communist
Party Committee. The Party Committee is not telling banks to act in the interest of shareholders, but
in accordance with “stability”, “lawfulness”, and national “macroeconomic measures”. Individuals
appointed to bank senior management posts are personnel with standing in the Communist Party hi-
erarchy (Howson, 2010) and move between government and state bank corporate functions. As such,
it is difficult for state owned banks to operate independently while facing pressure from different lev-
els of government. In terms of spatial bias, Liu (2007) notes that after the establishment of China’s
commercial banking system, bank lending concentrated not just on China’s state-owned enterprises,
but also major cities. One issue is that commercial banks in China have cautiously retrenched credit-
extending authority from their local branches (Liu, 2007). Bank branches below provincial level are
limited in their autonomy to extend credit to new clients and new investment projects. Branches in
cities are allocated funds for loans with stated priorities, and such allocations may reflect the political
influence and connections of local leaders to provincial and national leaders, as they attempt to gar-
ner credit for enterprises in their cities. In addition there are national industrial priorities announced
once every few years, aimed at expansion of particular industries through better access to credit (State
Council, 1989; 1997; 2000; 2005). To the extent such announced priorities actually affect capital
allocations, cities with an initial larger base of favored industries may gain. However, interviews we
conducted also suggest there is simply a lot of idiosyncratic variation in local practices both in interest
rate manipulation and charges and in default provisions. Corruption in the disbursement of loans is
analyzed in Nan and Meng (2009).
As the major banks in China are unable to function freely, bias measured in the capital market
captures signals of political favoritism. The bias in China’s capital market by firm type is well doc-
umented. For example, Dollar and Wei (2007) show much lower marginal products of capital in
the state compared to private sector in China for 2002-2004, consistent with the notion that private
firms have less political influence than state owned firms in capital markets. On the spatial side, early
research on China noted the differential access to capital markets as reflected in higher returns to
[shortage of] capital in the rural versus urban sector, or higher returns to rural town and village enter-
prises compared to state owned enterprises (Jefferson and Singhe, 1999; Au and Henderson, 2006a).
In this paper we expand these analyses to look more in-depth at spatial biases.
2.2 Other relevant literature
Apart from the literature on favoritism of major political cities, there is a literature on estimat-
ing the cost of capital. We utilize the traditional average revenue product [ARP] methodology as in
Dollar and Wei (2007), which differs from the recent work on China’s overall factor market distor-
tions. Starting with Hsieh and Klenow (2009), and extended by Gao (2013) and then by Song and
Wu (2013), these papers develop methodologies appropriate to identifying welfare losses from overall
factor distortions. Our objective, however, is to quantify specific differentials in the price of capital
faced by firms in different locations. Furthermore, we note that some of the simplifying assumptions
in the basic Hsieh and Klenow (2009) or Gao (2013) approach are unpalatable in an urban framework,
particularly the assumption of a single market clearing wage. From standard work on systems of cities
(Henderson, 1974; Roback, 1982; Duranton and Puga, 2004; Albouy, 2009b), while returns to capital
are equalized across space under a free capital market, there are large cross-city differences in nominal
wages and corresponding values of labor marginal products under national free mobility of labor that
equalizes real wages across cities. Because city sizes, industrial compositions, and costs-of-living
differ across cities in a first best equilibrium, nominal wages and marginal products of labor differ
as well. In developed countries such differences between a big and small city may be 60% or more
(Albouy, 2009a, Combes, Duranton and Gobillon, 2012) for both nominal wages and cost of living,
but in developing countries they can be much more (Henderson, 2002). To do a full analysis of distor-
tions one would require quality adjusted wage data for a large sample of Chinese cities. Also Hsieh
and Klenow (2009) assume firm constant returns to scale and a single nominal wage clearing all labor
markets in a country under free mobility equilibrium. Constant returns to scale has the uncomfortable
issue that, with costless trade, all production in an industry in a country should occur solely in the one
most efficient firm in that country.
Additionally, this paper relates to the literature on the uneven distribution of city sizes and their
differential growth rates within countries. For example, Duranton and Puga (2013) note that the pop-
ulation of US metropolitan areas range from 0.5 to over 18 million, and that their growth rates from
2000 to 2010 have a standard deviation as large as the mean. And in China more dramatically, the
distribution of this figure has a standard deviation double its mean 2. The relative differences have led
to modeling and empirical efforts to explain why there are wide size differences, with explanations
based on varying agglomeration economies and specialization, producer and consumer amenities, spa-
tial frictions and the like (e.g., Henderson, 1974; Roback, 1982; Duranton and Puga, 2013; Behrens
and Robert-Nicoud, 2015). Less is known about the role of institutional factors in affecting size dis-
tributions, such as democratization and federalism, although there is suggestive empirical work that
federalism and democratization both lead to reduced dispersion, or greater “equality” in spatial allo-
cations (Arzaghi and Henderson, 2005; Fetzer and Shanghavi, 2015). Work on political favoritism
especially in less than democratic regimes suggests that politically important cities in countries under
dictatorship enjoy substantially better amenities than their counterparts in the hinterlands (Ades and
Glaeser, 1995), leading to increased urban primacy. Country-specific evidence on favoritism of the
largest political cities is also documented for Indonesia in Henderson and Kuncoro (1996); and, in
Albouy (2009a, 2012), there is an analysis of bias in national taxation structures against bigger cities
in the US and Canada. This paper will look in a more comprehensive fashion at differential bais
across the entire set of cities in a country. A challenge to the literature remains how to incorporate
politics and bias into models looking at the differential allocation of resources across cities and the
size distribution of cities.
Finally, there is a large literature on migration restrictions in China. One strand motivates the
empirical approach in looking at the effect on capital cost reductions on city growth, where a key
element is the easing of migration restrictions after 2000 (e.g., Chan, 2010; Cai, 2006). The second
is a literature which suggests that the easing of such restrictions will lead to increased growth of what
are implicitly favored cities. While the existing theory (e.g., Duranton, 2007) predicts over-population
of favored cities in general under free mobility, Au and Henderson (2006a and 2006b) demonstrate
how formal migration restrictions muted the growth of cities in China in the 1990’s. Scholars in China
then argued that the State understood that such easing would induce greater population growth of the
biggest and political cities (Cai, 2006), and that localities would respond by trying to discourage such
in-migration, as in Brazil in the 1980’s (Feler and Henderson, 2011).
2Authors’ calculation.
3 Models
3.1 Quantifying capital market biases
In this subsection we first specify how to estimate the degree of China’s capital market favoritism
city-by-city. Our objective is to quantify specific differentials in the price of capital faced by firms
in different locations. Hence our specific estimates call for the average revenue product [ARP] ap-
proach, just as in Song and Wu (2013) when they look at how the costs of capital vary across certain
firm attributes, or as in Dollar and Wei (2007) when they look at favoritism by firm type.
The firm produces output with inputs of labor and capital, and output (value added) is taxed by a
VAT. In the framework, labor costs are assumed to vary by location and there can be non-optimization
in the choice of labor. Output markets are assumed to be relatively free, but the degree of local com-
petition will differ across industries and locations. We allow for non-constant returns to scale.
Firm i in industry j in location s has the optimization problem:
max
l,k
p∗jsAi jsxi j(li,ki)−w∗s li− ri jski (1)
where p∗js is output price to the firm net of taxes; and depends on industry, location, and competition.
Ai js is a Hicks neutral productivity shifter, representing inherent firm efficiency and local scale exter-
nalities; li, ki are firm specific firm inputs of labor and capital; w∗s is compensation cost per worker,
which varies in equilibrium by location; and ri js is the price of capital specific to the firm. Optimizing











where r¯ is the true market cost of capital and η js is the elasticity of demand facing a firm in industry
j in location s. If p∗js(1− 1η js )Ai js
∂x j(li,ki)
∂ki = ri js > r¯ that implies either the firm faces a higher than
market cost of capital or the firm faces a binding quantity constraint that raises its marginal revenue
product (and shadow price of capital) above the market return. If p∗js(1− 1η js )Ai js
∂x j(li,ki)
∂ki = ri js < r¯,
the firm is getting an effective subsidy in capital markets.
The literature typically approximates the production function as being log-linear, so x = Akα lφ .
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) = lnri js− ln(1− 1η js )− lnα j+ εi js (4)
While capital prices are specified to vary by each firm, in practice we have price of capital varying
by the typical firm of type i, in industry j and in location s. lnri js, relative to a base (e.g., private firms
in textiles on the coast in regular prefecture cities) is captured by a set of firm, industry, and location
type dummies. We note that the figures discussed earlier assume η js→ 0, α j = α, ∀ j. These industry
and elasticity terms will now be present and represented by controls to be discussed in section 5.1.
Note if equations 3 and 4 hold exactly, for implementation, issues of selection on for exam-
ple A’s where perhaps better firms go to better locations does not matter per se. The critical as-
sumption is that all firms adjust capital usage until the marginal revenue product which is propor-
tional to the average revenue product equals the price (or shadow price) of capital they face. For
the same price of capital, demand elasticity, and capital intensity, firms with higher A’s simply ex-
pand capital usage until they have the same p∗jsx j/ki, as firms with lower A’s, so A is not a right
hand side variable. This fact depends critically on the log linear specification. If for example we
have a constant elasticity of substitution production function where x = [alρ +bkρ ]
1




1−ρ ln[(1− 1η js )−1(p∗jsAi js)−ρ/ α j]. Then unobserved A’s appear on the right hand side
[RHS] and that creates problems in estimation if, say, the allocation of capital costs across firms is
related (positively or negatively) to firm efficiency. Secondly, if production is constant elasticity of
substitution [CES], the coefficient we estimate is 11−ρ lnri js =σ lnri js.This says for a given change in
the price of capital, responses rise with the elasticity of substitution, σ , in production as would be
expected.
The error term in equation 4 is for a firm in a city and industry, capturing for example optimization
and measurement error. As noted, if the specification is exact there are no identification problems in
the estimation of capital price differentials, even if capital prices are not randomly allocated across
cities. However, two sorts of problems may arise. The first is that variables may not fully capture
what they are intended to represent. For example, within an industry, α j’s may vary. Older firms with
more Soviet technological influence and engineering from the past may favor more capital intensive
technologies and younger or foreign direct investment influenced firms may favor lower capital inten-
sive technologies. If capital prices are slanted towards one group or another, that will bias estimates
of capital prices by firm type. The second type of problem relates to whether or not technology is
log-linear. If not, the unobserved A’s can be a RHS variable. If lower capital price are slanted towards
cities with higher A’s that could result in an under-estimate of capital market bias towards these cities.
This has two implications. Firstly our estimates of capital prices themselves could misrepresent the
extent of bias. In the results section we will experiment with some controls based on historical TFP by
city and firm type to try to control for A’s. The second implication is that, when we turn to city growth,
systematic biases could be related to factors that affect city growth. While we use a static model of
capital allocation, in a dynamic world with durable capital, expectations and risk play a role. Cities
that are favored may be viewed as lower risk or may have expectations of higher future growth, both
of which would reduce the current returns demanded on investments. These identification problems
will be analyzed below in the paper.
3.2 Capital market favoritism and city growth
Now, we turn to modeling the effect of capital market favoritism on city size and growth. For a
simple and standard city growth framework we turn to the Roback (1982) model, modified to incorpo-
rate the standard systems of cities model from Henderson (1974), as articulated in handbook chapters
(Duranton and Puga, 2004; Behrens and Robert-Nicoud, 2015; Desmet and Henderson, 2015). On
the production side we utilize a log-linear production technology, consistent with the previous spec-
ification of capital market bias estimation. In that specification we assume firms use capital (k) and
labor (l) to produce output x, where x= Akα lφ . Here to simplify discussion, we assume firm constant
returns to scale and perfect competition. Given these assumptions we set the corresponding unit cost
function equal to output price, or A−1s crαs w1−αs = ps, where for city s, As incorporates urban scale
economies and city production amenities, c is a collection of parameters, and w and r are respectively
the prices of labor and capital.
If we use the usual urban scale economy formulation, Lεs , where Ls is effective labor in the city to








where Cs contains c, the price and any amenity terms.
While this gives us urban wages it does not given us urban real income, or utility. For that we
turn to the standard urban model where workers commute in mono-centric city from residences to the
city center. Following Duranton and Puga (2004), workers live in a city where they must commute to
work in the city center. Each worker is endowed with 1 unit of labor, and commuting reduces time
spent working at a rate of 4t per unit distance commuted. Those living far from the city center spend
less on land rents to compensate for their higher commuting costs, or lost labor earnings. City land
rents are redistributed to urban workers. Per worker net income, after commuting and land rents are
paid and land rent income is redistributed, is y=w(1− tN) where N is city population3. City effective
total labor supply net of time spent commuting, L, is L= N(1− tN). Substituting into y= w(1− tN)







s (1− tNs)1+ ε1−α (6)
The economics literature has a standard empirical framework for evaluating the effect of capital
price differentials on city sizes, the Roback model. In the standard Roback model there is prefect
mobility of labor so everyone nationally earns y¯ (relevant to the time period). One might then argue
that cities are endowed with differential costs of capital in China in a world of perfect mobility. That
then results in differential changes in Ns such that ys = y¯. A city with a higher cost of capital will be






< 0, Z ≡ (1− tN)−1[ε/(1−α)(1−2tN)− tN]< 0 (7)
3Following Duranton and Puga (2004), in a linear city, where each worker is endowed with 1 unit of time and working
time is 1− 4tu where u is distance from the city center and 4t unit commuting costs, it is easy to derive expressions for
city labor force L as a function of population N (by integrating over the two halves of the city each of length N/2), for
the city rent gradient (equating rent plus commuting costs for a person at u with that of a person at the city edge where
rents are 0, so they are equally well off in equilibrium) and for total rents. These have forms respectively: L = N(1− tN);
R(u) = wt(2N− 4u); total rents= wtN2; where w is the wage rate. A person living at the city edge and paying zero rent
earns in net w(1−2tNU , with the diseconomy arising from increasing commuting distances reducing time available to work.
After getting a share in urban rent income their net income is y= w(1− tN).
which specifies a relationship between city size and price. Z is signed by imposing stability of city
size. In the model just presented, ceteris paribus, y rises, peaks, and then declines as N increases.
Stability in the Roback model requires the city be on the downward sloping part of the city size-real
income relationship. Note even in this simple framework the implied coefficient of a regression of city
size on price of capital represents complex function of parameters and size. That makes it difficult
to learn about specific parameter values. Inspection would suggest effects should be increasing in
capital’s share in production, α , as would be expected. We will estimate such an equation. However,
such estimation faces severe missing variables problem: all natural amenity and historical political
infrastructure differences (here captured by differentials in A) which might influence sizes and be re-
lated to prices of capital.
A standard way to try to deal with problems of missing variables bias in estimation of levels equa-
tions is to first difference out the A’s. The Chinese context presents a compelling context to help
with identification in a growth context. Labor mobility in China prior to 2000 was sharply limited as
explained above. A key change is relaxation of at least the formal migration restrictions right around
2000, inducing a surge in migration and facing cities with more elastic labor supplies. So our approach
is to argue that differentials in capital costs appear before 2000 and persist. The change inducing dif-
ferential growth is cities’ ability overall to attract migrants with an increase in the elasticity of labor
supply from the countryside facing all cities. We next argue that cities with lower prices of capital
have a larger increase in population with the change in supply elasticity than cities with higher prices
of capital.
To show this we assume the supply curve facing the city in y, N space is γsNδs where δ =
d logy/d logN is the inverse supply elasticity. We now look at the effect of an increase in δ , or
decrease in the supply elasticity of city population. Equating γsNδs to ys in equation 6, taking logs:
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Z−δ < 0, Z ≡ (1− tN)
−1[ε/(1−α)(1−2tN)− tN]< 0 (9)
where stability would require that Z− δ < 0. So an increase in the supply elasticity or decrease in
δ increases city population must be the case. The issue is to show that a city facing a lower cost of






This states that, if the cost of capital to a city is higher, the response in city population increase as
the supply elasticity changes is reduced. From equation 8 we can show that d logNd logr =
α
1−α (Z−δ )−1 <
0, given Z − δ < 0. Then we need to sign d(d logN/dδ )d logN by differentiating equation 9. This yields
d(d logN/dδ )
d logN =
Nt logN(1+ ε1−α )+(1−tN)2(Z−δ )
(Z−δ )2(1−tN)2 . This is not unambiguous since the second term in the nu-
merator is negative, even though the first contains a city size term. One can pick accepted values in
the literature on ε (0.02-0.08 in Behrens et al), α (0.25-0.35) and values of t such that real incomes
peak at city sizes from anywhere from 100,000 to 10,000,000, to make a numerical evaluation. The
bottom line will be as long as the starting value of δ is not too large, the expression will be positive,
with a benchmark being Roback where δ = 0. Our results will be consistent with the current signing
of equation 10.
In estimation, given the equilibrium size condition (yst = γNδstst ) for each time period is non-linear
and involves functional form simplifications/approximations, we use a simple growth formulation
where:
logNst+1− logNst = α+b0 logrst +Xstb1+ est+1, b0 < 0 (11)
where Nst is the population for city s at time t; r is our measurement of capital prices from the previous
section; X is the set of other characteristics that may affect growth. The sign of b0 is based on equa-
tion 10. Estimation of equation 11 faces obvious challenges such as unobservables correlated with the
price of capital which in themselves affect city growth. Our approach to identification is detailed in
Section 5 where relavant.
4 Data and descriptives
In this paper, we confine the analysis to the 283 prefectures in the provinces of the Han part of
China, where the spatial unit defining local market areas is the prefecture, which we have been label-
ing as a city. The data we use are from the survey of medium and large size industrial firms in each
year from 1998 to 2007, the last year the relevant economic data are available. The industries included
are all manufacturing plus utilities. The survey is designed to cover all state owned firms plus all other
firms with over 5 million RMB in annual sales. So our sample covers most of industrial output4. We
trim the samples as is common with the China data, where with typos and mis-reporting there can
be significant outliers. Our trimming is modest. We start by removing a tiny fraction of observations
which are clearly flawed: output, wages, fixed assets and material inputs are less than or equal to
zero; fringe benefits are negative, or current annual depreciation exceeds accumulated depreciation.
We then order observations by the ratio of value added to net assets, our main dependent variable. We
remove the top 2% of observations in each year and we remove at least the bottom 2%. At the bottom
we remove all observations with negative value added (rounding up to the nearest integer). In 2007
this is 2%. The fraction rises over time as we go backwards, with the most being 6% in 1998. Tables
will report specific numbers for each year.
For establishing capital market bias patterns across groups, we first define city-region and firm
types. As noted above for city types in China there is an administrative hierarchy: provincial level
cities, provincial capitals and other prefectures. We also distinguish regions (west, central, coast/east)
based on policy initiatives, such as those to promote development of the West. Firm types are defined
by the share of paid-in capital rather than legal status per se. The hierarchies of types we identify are
4Some firms have sales less than 5m RMB, but in 2007 that is only 2.2% of firms in the data. What are we missing in
this data set? From the 2008 Economic Census, 75.3% of industrial firms have under 5M RMB in sales, but they account for
only 5.8% of total industrial sales nationally. Nevertheless, to the extent there is even greater discrimination against smaller
firms we are potentially understating effects of discrimination.
(1) wholly state owned firms; (2) majority state owned firms, where 50% or more of paid in capital is
from the state; (3) wholly collective owned firms; (4) majority collective owned firms, where 50% or
more of paid in capital is from the collective, (unless the state owns 50%); (5) wholly private owned
firms; (6) majority private owned firms, where 50% or more of paid in capital is private (unless the
state or collective owns 50%); (7) wholly foreign owned firms; and (8) majority foreign owned firms,
where 50% or more of paid in capital is foreign owned (unless the state, collective, or private owns
50%)5. Table 1 shows the dramatic change in industrial structure for the 10 years, 1998-2007. In
1998 only 19% of firms are wholly private firms, while in 2007 that has risen to 72%. Correspond-
ingly there is a truly dramatic drop in the relative number of firms in the state owned sector, but a
more modest drop in the state owned sector’s share of value added. These reflect state policy focused
on limiting the state owned sector size, with the state sector focused on strategic key industries with
typically large plant sizes.
In gauging bias in terms of cost of capital, people typically look at two types of data. The first
is quantity data. Quantity data suggest that state-owned enterprises are favored in capital markets: in
2011, state enterprises only contributed 26.2% to national industrial output but still represented 43.9%
of total debt; the corresponding numbers for private firms were 29.9% and 17.8% (China Statistical
Yearbook, 2012). For cities, the City Statistical Yearbooks tell us that in fixed assets of industrial
enterprises per capita from 2002-2007 in provincial level cities was almost double that in ordinary
prefecture level cities despite the greater relative presence of manufacturing in the latter types of
cities. However, the problem with quantity data is that quantities may differ for reasons other than
favoritism: differential total factor productivity; varying efficiency by types of firms; disparate sub-
industry composition of firms in different types of cities; and better economic fundamentals in some
city types than others.
Thus, the more compelling raw data evidence is to look at the distributions of a simple measure
that is proportional to the private marginal product of capital under certain assumptions – perfect com-
petition, equal capital intensity across industries, and log-linear production functions. As discussed
in the previous section, that measure is the ratio of after-tax value added to net assets6 (as defined in
equation 4). Before getting into the econometric details, we first present here descriptive patterns of
5Note we break the small number of ties (0.34% of total firms) where ownership is equally split (50/50) in a hierarchical
fashion based on a modest presumption about level of political influence (highest to state, then collective, then domestic
private, then foreign). We drop the tiny percent (0.56% in 2007) of firms where there is no majority control. The issues with
this firm hierarchy have been well discussed in the literature and it is not our focus (specifically to capital markets there is
Dollar and Wei, 2007).
6We need to discuss the use of measure of capital stock in the context of the literature. Papers advocate for a perpetual
inventory based measure (see Brandt, van Biesebroeck, and Zhang, 2012; or Song and Wu, 2013), using accepted measures
of economic depreciation and investment price indices applied to investment flows, with a base of some form of first
recorded book value. The problem is that this requires linking firms across years using ID’s (that may be incorrectly
recorded), without interruption and missing values of investment series. These problems can generate significant losses in
sample, with then various fix-ups (Brandt, Tombe, and Zhu, 2013). An alternative is to use either gross book value or net
book value based on accounting depreciation and ignoring investment price increases. The tradeoff is that, the longer the
series for a firm the worse is the problem between an economic measure of capital stock and an accounting one (which uses
different depreciation rates and no indexing for price changes). However, our context is unusual. In the 10 years covered
by our sample, the total number of firms increases by 130%. In one critical margin, private firms, the number increased by
780% over the 10 years. About 50% of firms in 2007 have been in the data set for less than 5 years (Brandt, Tombe, and
Zhu, 2013). Therefore, we use net book value to avoid loss of sample which means we rely on accounting depreciation
rather than an economist’s estimate of depreciation and we do ignore price changes for investment although such changes in
the mid-2000’s are modest (Brandt, Tombe, and Zhu, 2013). We think this is a reasonable way to proceed, but do robustness
checks such as controlling for firm age later on.
this key variable to establish the existence of large scale capital cost variations across firm types and
cities in China. The descriptives support two central points. The first is more well known: favoritism
by firm type. Figure 1 for 2007 compares the (log) marginal returns of firms which are wholly or
majority state owned to those that are wholly privately owned. The distribution for private firms is
distinctly shifted to the right, indicating that they face either or both higher costs of capital or restricted
access to capital markets (and thus a higher shadow price of capital).
The second point is that, controlling for firm type, certain cities per se are favored in capital mar-
kets. While the approach when analyzing city growth across China will be general, in the first part of
the paper, we focus on known political cities and regions, compared to more ordinary cities. Figures
2 and 3 examine an aspect of this spatial dimension. Here the differentials are a little more mod-
est but still compelling. Figure 2 compares the returns for all wholly private firms in non-provincial
level cities nationally with (1) all firms in the 3 east coast provincial level cities (Beijing, Tianjin and
Shanghai) and (2) just wholly private firms in the same 3 east coast provincial level cities. The lat-
ter two distributions overlap suggesting that within provincial level cities, by 2007, all firms may be
treated fairly equally, at least as suggested by the raw data. However the returns for private firms in
non-provincial cities nationally are more concentrated and shifted right, compared to firms in provin-
cial level cities, suggesting political cities are favored in capital markets. Figure 3 isolates an example
and directly compares returns to privately owned firms in each of the three east coast provincial level
cities, Tianjin, Beijing and Shanghai, with the supposedly freer wheeling, more (non-state) capitalistic
cities in the south-east, in particular Guangzhou and Shenzhen. The ordering is very suggestive. The
worst distributions in terms of favoritism are for Beijing and its twin, Tianjin, the centers of national
political influence certainly in 2007. Then there is Shanghai, followed by Guangzhou. Guangzhou as
a provincial capital still has a distribution distinctly more concentrated and shifted to the right of those
for Beijing, Tianjin and arguably Shanghai. But Shenzhen dominates all these political cities with a
distribution distinctly to the right of all the others, reflecting its distinctly higher cost of capital.
5 Results
5.1 Estimating capital market favoritism
5.1.1 Regression specifications
As established in the previous sections, we estimate differences in the returns to capital by city,
accounting for differences in inherent firm and/or location productivity and in the degree of com-




lnri js− ln(1− 1η js )− lnα j+ εi js, the lnri js aspect is captured by fixed effects variously representing
firm type, city or region type and individual cities, depending on the specification and issue in dis-
cussion. In equation 4, industry fixed effects control for differences in α j. To control for differences
in demand elasticities, we include the number of firms in the industry the observation is in for that
prefecture (where the degree of local competition affects the local value of η js). To account for other
differences in demand elasticities, for each city-industry a firm is in, we control for measures of over-
all market scale and access, in particular distance to the coast and GDP within 150 kilometers of the
prefecture city center. Furthermore, to avoid feedback effects, the base industry firm counts are from
the 1995 industrial census and the income measures are for 1990 GDP. Results are robust to other
dating choices for these controls (such as for 2007 estimation, 2004 Census firm counts and 2000
GDP).
In the following subsections, we present the estimation on capital market favoritism as they per-
tain to Chinese policies and give suggestive evidence of political influence. We will first focus on
the 2007 cross-section pattern to establish the methodology. Then we turn to all ten years of results,
which we relate to political events, so as to argue the link between capital market prices and political
influence.
5.1.2 Illustrative results on city type and regional favoritism in 2007
Table 2 presents the cross-sectional results for 2007. The first two columns look at the effect on
average returns of being a particular type of firm, in a particular type of location. We represent the
hierarchy of firm types in each column and a simple characterization of spatial differences, based on
city-region types, not individual cities. For these, the base case covers private firms in east coast ordi-
nary prefecture level cities. Column 1 controls only for industry fixed effects, while all other columns
reflect the inclusion of city-industry characteristics affecting local demand elasticities. Many of the
results are similar but our preferred specification is in column 2.
In column 2, for firm types, relative to wholly private owned firms, wholly and majority state
owned firms have about 45-50% lower marginal products and effective prices of capital. Foreign
firms have about 25% lower returns; this may reflect their overall easier access to (international) cap-
ital than domestic private firms. In the smaller collective sector, wholly owned have modestly higher
costs and majority owned modestly lower costs. Finally, compared to wholly owned private firms,
majority owned private firms also face lower effective prices of capital. In the Appendix Table A2,
we look at these majority owned categories for collectives, foreign and private. If the minority stake-
holder is the state, compared to not the state, returns are typically 20 percentage points lower. That is,
the role of the state ownership in having better access to capital markets extends beyond majority and
wholly state owned firms to ones where the state is a minority stakeholder.
Next, turning to our main focus, spatial biases, we examine how the price of capital in the four
provincial level cities, in provincial capitals as a group, and by west and east region differs relative to
ordinary prefecture level cities on the coastal region. Below when we look across years we will build
an evolving political story around this. For regions, we ask if the policy of developing the hinterlands,
especially the West has any bite in capital markets. We see in column 2 in fact overall the price of
capital in the West and Middle regions is higher than on the coast in 2007, despite the “develop the
West” rhetoric. When we group together provincial capitals, perhaps surprisingly, on average com-
pared to ordinary prefecture cities in the Coast, we find no significant differences. Finally we look
at each of the 4 provincial level cities at the top of the hierarchy on their own. For provincial level
cities, the twins, Beijing and Tianjin in 2007 have favored access with distinctly lower returns: 19%
for Beijing and 30% for Tianjin in column 2. On the other hand Chongqing and Shanghai operate the
same as ordinary prefecture level cities on the coast. Below, we will see that these patterns differ over
time, as national leadership changes.
In columns 3-6 we conduct robustness checks. Firstly in column 3 we replace the measure of
capital stock, net book value, by gross book value. While qualitatively results are the same, using
gross book value tends to inflate the degree of bias for, for example, the state owned sector with its
older firms (with long series of non-depreciated gross capital numbers). In column 4 we give the Least
Absolute Deviations [LAD] estimates for column 2 to check that measures based on the median as
opposed to average firms are similar. The coefficients in the two columns are remarkably similar. In
column 5, we add to column 2 a control for firm age. That has no effect on spatial biases but affects
magnitudes for the older state owned firms.
Finally in column 6 we explore the bias issue from missing covariates in a non-log-linear specifi-
cation, in particular city (and industry) specific A’s. We have 1995 industrial census data (where we
do not observe paid in capital by firm type). For 1995 we calculate TFP for each firm as ln(netVA)−
0.30lnk+0.70ln l. We then regress TFP on industry and city fixed effects, as well as elasticity con-
trols on 1995 numbers of firms in the own industry in the city, log distance to the coast and 1990
GDP within 150 kilometers from the city. Then we insert these measures of industry and city TFP
into the column 2 specification. The TFP variables themselves have large positive but at best weakly
significant effects. Second, they have no effect on other the covariates in this table. This is not to say
we do not have an omitted variables problem, but this specification is encouraging as it suggests that
missing A’s may not be a key issue.
5.1.3 Margin at which to measure bias
In Table 3 we turn to several issues that are critical to final choices on how to measure city type
or city-by-city biases. Column 1 of Table 3 repeats the base result from column 2, Table 2. The first
issue is that if we want to represent city bias, do we control for firm type or look just at private firms?
Column 2 presents results for just private firms; results on the city-type and regions are very similar
as for all firms in column 1. In column 3, we look at all firms again, but remove firm type controls.
The idea is that a city faces two sources of bias that we may want to combine. Firstly, all industries
are favored by some percent; and, second, a city may have a firm type composition where it has more
favored types of firms, such as state owned firms. The combined effect is captured in column 3. Since
cities grow both by new firm entry and expansion of existing firms of all types, it is possible this over-
all measure may be more relevant. However, again the city type and region results are very similar to
column 1.
Finally, in columns 4-6 of Table 3 we turn to the actual measures considered for the growth anal-
ysis in Section 3. For these we remove the region and provincial capital variables, and have a fixed
effect for every city with Shenzhen being the base city but we just report for the 4 provincial level
cities. In column 4 we show results where we control for firm type. In column 5, we remove firm
type controls and in column 6 we show for just private firms. We have three key findings. First in
column 4 relative to column 1, we get almost identical firm type effects. Second and mostly critically,
in columns 4-6 with a full set of individual city fixed effects, where the base city is Shenzhen, results
on cities are not really comparable with those in columns 1-3. All we can say is that all provincial
level cities are favored relative to Shenzhen.
The third result is that if we take the 3 sets of city fixed effects in columns 4-6 the three pairwise
correlations are all over 0.9775. This suggests that variants of the basic formulation give very similar
results. We are generally going to rely in what follows on the results for the full sample without firm
type controls, although we will report some results when we add back in firm type controls.
5.1.4 Ten-year patterns and national politics
Are these region, provincial capital, and provincial level city patterns the same over time? We will
argue that we expect them to change to some degree with national leadership. The Communist Party
has factions and a hierarchy, although a precise description is elusive and there is inter-mingling. The
key in the hierarchy are the Princelings, who are the descendants of senior communist officials his-
torically in the People’s Republic of China (Li, 2013). Two other factions stand out, the “Shanghai”
branch (Shanghai bang) and the Communist Youth League, or what we call “Beijing” branch (tuan-
pai). Until early 2003, Jiang Zemin was in office and represented the Shanghai branch of the party. As
such he may have favored Shanghai relative to other cities. But he was also a reformer and committed
to privatization (Li, 2001). When Hu Jintao was selected for office in late 2002 (officially to take ef-
fect in early 2003) he represented more the Beijing branch of the party and in subsequent years pulled
back on the full thrust of privatization reforms (Li, 2002; Li, 2005). These national changes affected
policy, which might be represented in the city-type and region fixed effects, as well as firm type effects.
What are the patterns over time? In Table 4 we repeat the Table 2 column 2 formulation for all
years. For firm type variables, we see the massive advantage of state owned firms erodes almost mono-
tonically with time, starting at a 118% discount on the cost of capital and falling to 49%. Collectives
experience little change and little advantage or disadvantage over time. The advantage of foreign firms
also declines. That could be because capital markets in China improve, so that the overall advantage
of access to international capital markets declines. Or it could be that that state promoted (subsidized)
foreign firms more in the early years, but less or not at all later on.
Of central interest to this paper are the regional effects. There are some particular patterns in the
data that coincide with changes in national leadership. We do not want to make too much of this, but
they nonetheless motivate the idea that politics play a significant role in the capital market. In Table 4
and coefficients graphed in Figure 4, relative to ordinary prefecture cities in the east, cities in the West
have lower costs of capital under the Jiang Zemin regime but under Hu Jintao that reverses with the
West facing higher costs of capital, whatever the rhetoric may have been.
More telling, under the Jiang Zemin regime, Shanghai faced lower costs and Beijing higher costs
of capital. That differential disappears by 2003/04 as the Party regime switches more to a Beijing ori-
entation with Hu Jintao coming to office. By 2006/07 under Hu Jintao, the pattern has reversed with
Beijing facing lower costs of capital and its twin, Tianjin, being very heavily favored from 2004 on.
Under neither regime do provincial capitals as a group experience advantages or disadvantages. The
graph in Figure 4 suggests some degree of convergence in these differentials by spatial units towards
zero in 2003 then strong divergence after that. Is that a more general pattern in the data: narrowing of
spatial differences and then divergence?
To see if the data suggests a more general pattern of convergence and divergence, we turn to the
analysis of individual city fixed effects presented in column 4 of Table 3. We re-estimate the Table
4 specification, for each year with firm type variables and region and provincial capital indicators re-
moved, but having a complete set of city fixed effects, where Shenzhen is the base case in each year.
Changes in the mean are not relevant since that is about Shenzhen versus other cities in China. To
look at changes in dispersion we examine the time pattern of the coefficients of variation for these
year-by-year city fixed effect coefficients. Figure 5 plots these. The coefficient of variation is lowest
at the end of the Jiang Zemin era in 2002. After 2004 and especially as we move into 2006 and 2007
the coefficient escalates, consistent with overall increase in dispersion of capital prices across cities,
and retrenchment from aspects of reform in capital markets.
Correspondingly in Table 5 we examine the year-by-year pairwise correlations in these annual
vectors of city fixed effects. Two items emerge. On the relevant diagonal, the sequential year correla-
tion is lowest in 03-04 and 04-05, in the early years of Hu Jintao’s leadership. Secondly fixed effects
in say 1998 (but any year up to 2002) remain highly correlated with those for subsequent years up
until about 2004 when that correlation drops noticeably in years subsequent to 2004. That suggests
a change in patterns of city capital market favoritism, timed with the change in national leadership.
Again, these are suggestive results, indicating that capital markets in China are politicized and cer-
tainly different cities face evolving prices of capital as individual city fortunes evolve over time.
5.2 How does capital market favoritism affect growth?
5.2.1 Regression specifications
In this section, we turn to a central theme of the city-urban bias literature: cities which experience
favoritism will have larger populations. To examine it here, we look at the effect of the change in
population supply elasticities to cities after 2000, to show that cities with lower prices of capital
experience larger population increases. Recall from section 3, we propose to estimate a standard city
growth equation 11:
logNst+1− logNst = α+b0 logrst +Xstb1+ est+1
with expected b0 < 0. Similarly, we also do the parallel analysis for the 2010 (log) level of city sizes
to shed light on the long-run equilibrium effect:
logNs,2010 = α ′+b′0 logrst +Xstb′1+ e′st+1 (12)
with expected b′0 < 0.
First, we need to deal with the issue of how to characterize capital market favoritism as it af-
fects city population growth from 2000 to 2010. One idea that relates to identification is to go with
pre-period measures of favoritism (i.e., 1998-1999), as occurring before shocks to city growth dur-
ing the 2000 - 2010 time period (such as later changes in political leadership and contemporaneous
favoritism). Note unlike Table 4 where each year is treated separately, to reduce noise we pool two
adjacent years to try to capture pre-growth period favoritism. We use a 98-99 measure of city fixed
effects, which will be uncorrelated with later shocks affecting growth from 2000 to 2010. However
rather than a pre-period measure, we might want to try instead to capture the effects after 2002 of the
changes in capital market favoritism that followed changes in national leadership. For this we would
want to know the later, say 06-07, level of favoritism. We show a variety of OLS specifications, exper-
imenting with different measures of favoritism, before turning to the instrumental variable estimates.
The challenges to arguing that we identify the causal effects of capital market favoritism on city
growth are twofold. The first issue is the possibility of selection bias – it could be that favored cities
are ones with more growth potential to begin with – that is favoritism is not randomly sprinkled across
cities. In examining prefecture population growth from 2000 to 2010, to try to mitigate the issue of
non-random favoritism we control for pre-period growth trends (in an era of strong migration restric-
tions, 1982-1990). Secondly, even if favoritism was spatially randomized, favoritism of cities may be
favored in dimensions other than capital markets. In order to separate out capital market favoritism
from what other aspects the estimated fixed effects might represent, we add relevant controls for which
we have measures. There are two main concerns: other types of favoritism and aspects of capital mar-
ket efficiencies that may be correlated with our measures of capital market favoritism. Other forms of
favoritism would be public sector allocations and amongst all infrastructure investment is the key. We
might expect that if a city if favored in “private” capital markets it might be favored with subsidized
public infrastructure investments. For that, we control for the key item: allocations of major highways
to cities in 1999. From Baum-Snow, Brandt, Henderson, Turner and Zhang (2014) we extract a count
of major highway rays going out from the city center.
For aspects of capital market (in)efficiencies hindering growth we have two concerns. The first
one is that a lower local price of capital for all firms overall in a city could also be correlated with
a local culture of enhanced market reforms and privatization, building on a long standing notion that
cities dominated by SOE’s suffered from slower reforms, inhibiting growth (Naughton, 2007; see also
Au and Henderson, 2006a,b). Secondly and in contrast, a lower price of capital could be associated
with the propping up of local firms who are inefficient, detracting from city growth potential. To deal
with these two concerns we utilize two measures from the 1995 Census of Industry. In 1995 we do
not have data on types of firms other than by title; from that we extract the share in employment of
LTD firms that are supposed to be limited liability private firms in 1995, as a measure of the local
culture of reform and enthusiasm for privatization in a city. To deal with aspects of capital market
bias which may be correlated with gross inefficiencies in the operation of local markets, for 1995 we
control for the share of industrial employment by firms with revenues which do not cover operating
costs, or specifically value added is less than labor costs.
After all of these considerations and adjustment to the specification, identification is still a con-
cern. For example, even pre-period measures of capital prices may be correlated with unobserved
persistent conditions that affect city growth directly, like aspects of local business culture which per-
sist over time and we do not capture fully with our controls. The use of 06-07 measures of favoritism
is even more challenging. Increased favoritism after 2002 may be correlated with other shocks that
stimulate city growth. And there may be other dimensions to city favoritism correlated with capital
prices for which we do not fully capture with our controls. Ideally, in this non-experimental context
there would be an instrument, which was correlated with capital market favoritism per se but not with
city growth potential or other forms of favoritism. We return to this issue after presenting the OLS
results.
5.2.2 OLS Results
Table 6 presents OLS results for city population growth from 2000 to 2010. Recall that cities with
higher costs of capital are expected to have smaller population increases after the relaxation of many
migration restrictions. For prices of capital we use the individual city fixed effect coefficients from
specifications where we pool 2 years of data and generally do not control for firm type. Standard
errors are bootstrapped. We start with pre-period estimates of city fixed effects as the key covariate.
The first 3 columns show 2000-2010 growth regressed on a set of pre-period covariates. In column 1
the only covariate is the city fixed effects from 98-99 representing the city-by-city cost of capital (in
logs). The effect is insignificant and has a sign that is positive, as opposed to the expected negative
sign. Column 2 adds in controls which may be directly correlated with the cost of capital, but have
their own effects. In particular, the share of employment by firms whose revenues are not covering
basic operating costs would detract from growth and be negatively correlated with the cost of capital.
Thus adding these controls turns the positive coefficient to the expected negative sign but it is still
insignificant. In column 3, we add in other basic controls for growth that could be incidentally (or
otherwise) correlated with the cost of capital. These include 1982 population and 82-90 growth of
prefecture population as controls both for size and for early growth trends, distance to the coast which
represents poorer access to export markets and 1999 road rays which represents greater infrastructure
investments in the city. Controlling for these factors makes the cost of capital coefficient more neg-
ative and significant at the 1% level. In column 3, a 1% decrease in the cost of capital is associated
with an increase in city size of 0.07%. Column 4 repeats column 3 with a measure of 98-99 city fixed
effects from a specification with firm type controls; the coefficient is then modestly enhanced relative
to column 3.
Column 5 presents results for city capital prices measured in 06-07 with strong negative effects of
similar magnitude as column 3. This could be the most relevant column. For growth from 2000-2010,
it would be the price of capital after the national political regime switch in 2002/03, which should
mostly drive growth and a mid-period (for 2003-2010) estimate should capture the average price dif-
ferential across cities as these start to widen after 2003 (Figure 5). The elasticity in column 5 is a
little larger than column 3, at 0.08%. Column 6 controls for both 98-99 and 06-07 capital prices. Both
significantly deter growth, with marginal effects being somewhat higher for the later price measure.
These OLS results are suggestive of the effects of capital market favoritism on growth, but there are
clearly many sources of bias, in addition to the downward bias of measurement error.
5.2.3 Identification: challenges and solutions
In addressing the endogeneity concerns in the OLS specification discussed above, our hope was to
find a suitable instrument for individual city level bias in capital prices. We thought of two potential
solutions. Firstly, we turned to national policies supposedly governing differential capital allocations
across types of industries and then deriving a city specific version of those based on cities’ historical
industrial composition, a Bartik (2002) - Card (2001) type instrument. For the second candidate, we
turned to political variables, measuring changes in local leadership and their relationship to national
factions of the party following the national leadership change in early 2003.
For constructing the Bartik-Card type instrument, we compile the lists of favored industries an-
nounced by China’s State Council once every few years. Amongst the specific industrial favoritism
policies, one key is allowing greater access to capital markets. For 2000 and 2005 we coded the fa-
vored industries at the 4 digit level, with a “1” for favored and “0” for not listed. We calculated for
both the 1995 census and the 1998 survey of industries the share of each 4-digit industry in 1990 pre-
fecture manufacturing employment (from the 1990 Population Census). We multiplied the share by
the indicator of favored or not and summed across the 4-digit industries, to create an index of city-like
capital market favoritism from national industrial policies for 2000 and 2005.
In Table 7 we present what might have been a first stage of an IV regression with this index of
national favoritism. The 06-07 fixed effects are regressed on the index in 2005 for each city for the
two sets of Bartik weights. With regression controls from Table 6 or without controls, this index is
unrelated to our measures of capital market prices. Recognizing that many favored industries have
been on the books for many years, we looked at just 35 newly favored ones added between 2000 and
2005; again there was no relationship to capital market prices. We also worried that our controls for
2-digit industry effects in the basic city fixed effects regression was limiting variation in the data, and
we re-estimated city fixed effects without these controls. But these new fixed effects again are uncor-
related with national industry favoritism indices relevant to each city. All this suggests that whatever
national industrial policies are on the books, this has no effect on individual city capital market prices
in the later 2000’s. While disappointing to an identification strategy, the non-result hints that political
forces drive price differentials, not policies announced by national planners.
We then looked at observable political events at the local level. A newly appointed local leader
with good patronage ties may bring in favorable capital market conditions. We know when local pre-
fecture leaders (party secretary) change office and thought that newly appointed ones in the late 2002
to end of 2004 time frame might be more favored leaders under certain conditions. There were also an
unusual number of changes in early 2003: 57 in the first 4 months where usually that would be about
20. We do not know the affiliation of these party secretaries but we know the affiliation of the provin-
cial governors who appointed them. We know if those governors are Princelings, Communist Youth
League (“Beijing” branch), “Shanghai affiliated”, no known affiliation, or ambiguous affiliation, from
records and a data set assembled by Qinghua Zhang of Peking University. Being a new party secre-
tary appointed by one of these types of provincial leaders actually gives us a first stage for predicting
capital market prices for 06-07, as reported in column 1 of Table 8. Relative to no new appointment
(about 50% of the cases), a new appointment that is the most politically connected in the party hi-
erarchy, a “Princeling”, brings a low price, while “fence-sitting” (ambiguous affiliation) brings the
highest. This first stage then gives a second stage reported in column 2 of Table 8. The capital market
price is significant and now even more negative than the OLS results with an elasticity of -0.12. If this
is the true elasticity, it implies that a one standard deviation decrease in the price of capital (see Ta-
ble 10) would increase city growth by 4% relative to an average growth overall from 2000-2010 of 5%.
The first stage results are consistent with our idea that politics play a big role in capital market
distortions. The problem is that politics may not only drive capital market prices but other forms of
local favoritism. New dynamic local leaders appointed from late 2002 to 2004 with better connections
to the national new leadership may have brought in other dimensions of favoritism. All this suggests
that the use of political instruments (in the literature for all kinds of local conditions) are suspect and
must be viewed with caution. At best the -0.12 estimate relative to -0.08 in Table 6 is correcting for
measurement error; at worst it is biased estimate picking up other favoritism factors besides capital
market favoritism. Then what we have is a reduced form estimate of the overall effect of bais, not just
capital market bias.
5.2.4 How levels results differ
We now turn to more typical types of estimates in the favoritism literature, which uses a cross-
section approach. In Table 9 we show results of estimating a levels equation as in equation 12, where
the LHS variable is the log of prefecture population in 2010. Such a cross-section estimation may
be worrisome for potentially larger bias than the growth estimation, because fixed city characteris-
tics which affect size are differenced out in the latter. Nonetheless, this estimation sheds light on the
long-term outcome of capital market favoritism on city sizes with implied full adjustment, while the
growth estimation is only for 2000-2010. Column 1 of Table 9 shows the results for the formulation
corresponding to Table 6 column 3, and column 2 shows the second-stage IV result corresponding to
Table 8 column 2. The set of control variables is kept identical. Essentially, we are looking at 2010
population conditioning on 1982 population, 82-90 population growth and other city characteristics
as a way of controlling for unobserved city amenity differentials (Duranton and Turner, 2012). Now
we see larger impacts of differences in capital costs on city size as might be expected. From the IV
results, a 1% reduction in the price of capital reduces city size in 2010 by 0.19%, whereas the growth
results suggest a 0.12% reduction in growth.
5.2.5 Spillovers and heterogeneity
What about potential spillovers and heterogeneity? For spillovers, neighbors’ prices of capital
may affect an own city in two ways. Firstly, lower neighbor prices that spur their development may
result in increased demand for own city products, in a market access context. On the other hand,
lower neighbor prices of capital may make them better able to compete for local resources (e.g., re-
gional labor) and hurt the own city. To the Table 6 column 3 base case, if we add in the average of
all contiguous neighbors’ prices controlling for own and neighbor characteristics (other dimensions
on which neighbors compete), we get a small (absolute value less than 0.01) negative coefficient for
this spatially weighted neighbors’ price of capital. In a column 5 or 6 formulation, the coefficient
on contemporaneous (i.e., pooled 2006/07) prices is negative and significant7. All in all, the signing
of the coefficient on contiguous neighbor’s average capital price suggest that higher neighbor prices
hurt the own city, presumably via the aforementioned channel of reducing their demand for own city
products.
We examine heterogeneity in two dimensions. We first asked if capital intensity as measured by
capital share in value added or as the capital to labor ratio either increased from 2000 to 2007, or was
higher in 2007 (as a level “long run” effect) for lower priced cities. The use of capital relative to labor
is based on a clear price effect, and is thus the simplest measure8. In all of our tested formulations, an
increase in the price of capital reduces capital intensity. Focusing on IV results (with Kleibergen-Paap
F-statistic of 8.8), which correspond to the formulations in Tables 8 and 9, we find the following. In
a growth formulation, the elasticities of capital intensity with respect to price are -0.27 and -0.72 re-
spectively for intensity measured by the capital to labor ratio and by the capital share in value added.
For 2007 levels of capital intensity, the elasticities are -0.55 and -0.90 respectively. All but the first
of the four listed are statistically significant. We conclude that indeed higher prices of capital reduce
capital intensity, passing a basic test of what one might expect.
Additionally, we asked if cities with higher capital intensities have stronger price effects on size
as might be expected from the model. We measure capital intensity variously as total industrial survey
capital in 1998, 1999, or the average of both per industrial worker for corresponding years, per total
employment in 2000, and as a share of value added. In the OLS versions corresponding to Table 6,
capital intensity itself generally has a positive and sometimes significant effect on growth, but the
7We have no way to do an IV version of this with any strength as in Table 8.
8Share measure responses depend on the specific functional form of production
interaction with the price of capital generates a tiny positive and mostly insignificant effect, where
a negative effect is expected. We also tried an IV version as in Table 8 where we use 2007 capital
intensity measures instrumented with historical intensity measures (with the price variable also instru-
mented for as in Table 8). There the interaction terms are negative as expected but insignificant; and
the first stage regressions are very weak. Trying to capture an interaction term with shifting capital
intensities over time seems to be more than we can do with our data.
5.2.6 Thinking about welfare cost implications
In this paper, what we have estimated is a micro econometric relationship that describes, from the
equilibrium in China, how the growth or size of a single city would change as response to a change
in the price of capital. Evaluating welfare impacts requires two considerations. For the single city, an
increase in size in principle moves it further down its average real income curve as graphed against
city size so the city is more over-sized and operating at a less efficient scale. If the real income curve
is relatively flat this loss in efficiency might be quite small; but there is the factor of giant over-sized
political cities with teeming slums and the work in Henderson (2003) showing considerable growth
losses induced by excess primacy, with a more nuanced approach now available in Castells-Quintana
(2015). Secondly, however, the welfare inference issue is much bigger. In a deeper analysis moving
beyond a partial equilibrium look at one city, in a general equilibrium context such as in Hsieh and
Klenow (2009), we would be trying to quantify the effects on real national income of misallocation of
capital across cities on a national scale. But that involves a general equilibrium model where there are
cities and efficient nominal wage differentials between bigger and smaller cities in equilibrium. And
for China this would be in the context of limited labor mobility. While our ability to carry out such
analysis has improved (Desmet, Nagy, and Rossi-Hansberg, 2015), we are still some distance from
combined micro-econometric and structural estimation that would allow a proper evaluation in such
complex contexts. But it would be fundamental to evaluating welfare costs.
6 Conclusion
This paper provides evidence on political favoritism in China’s capital market and quantifies the
differentials by firm, city, and region types. We also document the shifting climate in city and regional
favoritism over time in light of national and local leadership changes. Lastly, we make a serious at-
tempt to identify the causal relationship between capital market favoritism and city population growth
in China. Our basic findings are as follows.
Firm type affects the cost of capital. Compared to private firms, wholly or majority state owned
firms earn a much lower return on capital consistently across space. The inferred value of marginal
product of capital is over 50% lower for state owned firms in 2007. This is an improvement over
the 117% lower returns for state owned firms in 1998. By city and region type, the provincial level
political cities and regions experience changing costs of capital related to changing national policies
and leadership. In the early years under Jiang Zemin, Shanghai and the West were favored relative to
Beijing and Tianjin. By 2006-2007 under Hu Jintao, this has reversed. Dispersion in capital market
prices across cities drops to a low in 2002 and then escalates under Hu Jintao, representing a reintro-
duction of willingness to intervene in capital markets.
We then test the effects of a lower price of capital on the growth of cities after the national re-
laxation in migration restrictions in the period around 2000. Controlling for other factors likely to
be correlated with the costs of capital which also affect city growth, we find strong and suggestive
evidence that lower costs of capital result in larger increases in city size. This finding is further sup-
ported and its magnitude strengthened in the better defended causal context with local political faction
affiliation as the instrumental variable. Additionally, we also examined the spatial dimension of this
relationship between capital prices and city sizes by considering neighboring cities, following by brief
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Figure 1. 2007 Differential Returns. Ownership Comparison at National Level   
State owned or majority controlled firms versus wholly private firms 





Figure 2. 2007 Differential Returns. All Private Firms Nationally in Non-Provincial Level 
Cities versus Private and also All Firms in East Coast Provincial Level Cities 




Figure 3. Differential Return. Wholly Private Firms by Major City.  
Prefecture Level East Coast Cities versus South Coast Free Wheeling Cities 
Distribution of after tax value added divided by net asset value  
 
 
Figure 4. Overtime changes in place based bias coefficients 
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Table 2. Base results for 2007 







  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
West 0.0377 0.2361*** 0.1803** 0.2630*** 0.2413*** 0.2463*** 
 
(0.0583) (0.0707) (0.0781) (0.0131) (0.0703) (0.0695) 
Central 0.0672 0.2034*** 0.2501*** 0.2361*** 0.2039*** 0.1978*** 
 
(0.0506) (0.0573) (0.0606) (0.0096) (0.0573) (0.0576) 
Provincial capital -0.0074 0.0216 -0.0455 0.0272*** 0.024 0.0168 
 
(0.0812) (0.0883) (0.0886) (0.0085) (0.0886) (0.0852) 
Beijing -0.2405*** -0.1935*** -0.2961*** -0.1850*** -0.1910*** -0.1691** 
 
(0.0390) (0.0711) (0.0707) (0.0222) (0.0712) (0.0748) 
Shanghai 0.0432 0.0293 -0.0579 0.0766*** 0.0301 0.0469 
 
(0.0396) (0.1310) (0.1322) (0.0211) (0.1311) (0.1355) 
Chongqing 0.0119 0.0067 -0.0249 0.0189 0.0074 0.0623 
 
(0.0506) (0.0942) (0.0989) (0.0316) (0.0939) (0.1002) 
Tianjin -0.3015*** -0.2966*** -0.3309*** -0.2854*** -0.2961*** -0.2765*** 
 
(0.0379) (0.0784) (0.0772) (0.0229) (0.0786) (0.0820) 
Wholly state -0.4614*** -0.4491*** -0.6271*** -0.4253*** -0.3793*** -0.4486*** 
 
(0.0305) (0.0293) (0.0302) (0.0182) (0.0332) (0.0292) 
Majority state -0.4978*** -0.5004*** -0.6839*** -0.5094*** -0.4672*** -0.4988*** 
 
(0.0491) (0.0470) (0.0441) (0.0313) (0.0486) (0.0469) 
Wholly collective 0.1160*** 0.1161*** -0.0733** 0.1487*** 0.1459*** 0.1183*** 
 
(0.0270) (0.0252) (0.0294) (0.0145) (0.0247) (0.0251) 
Majority collective -0.1145*** -0.1302*** -0.3167*** -0.1291*** -0.1044*** -0.1269*** 
 
(0.0390) (0.0331) (0.0356) (0.0272) (0.0323) (0.0336) 
Wholly foreign -0.2385*** -0.2777*** -0.3833*** -0.2963*** -0.2785*** -0.2762*** 
 
(0.0334) (0.0374) (0.0418) (0.0086) (0.0372) (0.0375) 
Majority foreign -0.2014*** -0.2307*** -0.3917*** -0.2514*** -0.2272*** -0.2297*** 
 
(0.0263) (0.0262) (0.0335) (0.0171) (0.0263) (0.0265) 
Majority private -0.2138*** -0.2268*** -0.3144*** -0.2268*** -0.2182*** -0.2276*** 
 
(0.0209) (0.0203) (0.0203) (0.0118) (0.0203) (0.0203) 
Firm age 
    
-0.0041*** 
 
     
(0.0009) 
 1995 industrial TFP Fixed effects 
    
0.7069 
      
(0.8064) 
1995 city TFP fixed effects 
     
0.1408* 
      
(0.0823) 
Industry fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Elasticity controls  No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 312351 312351 312142 312351 312351 312351 
R-squared 0.0767 0.0836 0.1028   0.0844 0.0843 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. This table shows various specifications to look at the cross-sectional average 
return differentials by firm type and locational hierarchy in 2007. Column 1 accounts for industry fixed effects, 
while columns 2-6 include city-industry fixed effects reflecting local demand elasticities. Column 2 is our preferred 
specification.  
  














  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
West 0.2361*** 0.2778*** 0.2117***    
 
(0.0707) (0.0769) (0.0722)    
Central 0.2034*** 0.2169*** 0.1947***    
 
(0.0573) (0.0623) (0.0584)    
Provincial capital 0.0216 0.0209 0.0053    
 
(0.0883) (0.1013) (0.0847)    
Beijing -0.1935*** -0.2567*** -0.2183*** -0.6341*** -0.5185*** -0.7796*** 
 
(0.0711) (0.0758) (0.0748) (0.0399) (0.0410) (0.0447) 
Shanghai 0.0293 0.0289 -0.0135 -0.4698*** -0.4305*** -0.5872*** 
 
(0.1310) (0.1425) (0.1350) (0.0492) (0.0507) (0.0553) 
Chongqing 0.0067 -0.0155 0.0044 -0.2701*** -0.1177* -0.3201*** 
 
(0.0942) (0.0985) (0.0974) (0.0682) (0.0677) (0.0744) 
Tianjin -0.2966*** -0.3490*** -0.3457*** -0.7185*** -0.6543*** -0.8629*** 
 
(0.0784) (0.0848) (0.0820) (0.0382) (0.0397) (0.0421) 
Wholly state -0.4491***   -0.4222***   
 
(0.0293)   (0.0261)   
Majority state -0.5004***   -0.4735***   
 
(0.0470)   (0.0452)   
Wholly collective 0.1161***   0.1069***   
 
(0.0252)   (0.0173)   
Majority collective -0.1302***   -0.1113***   
 
(0.0331)   (0.0286)   
Wholly foreign -0.2777***   -0.2973***   
 
(0.0374)   (0.0300)   
Majority foreign -0.2307***   -0.2196***   
 
(0.0262)   (0.0225)   
Majority private -0.2268***   -0.1795***   
 
(0.0203)   (0.0182)   
Industry fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Elasticity controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
City fixed effects  No No No Yes Yes Yes 
N 312351 225086 312351 312351 312351 225086 
R-squared 0.0836 0.062 0.0738 0.1308 0.122 0.1202 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. This table presents a variant of specifications to establish how we measure 
bias in the capital market. Column 1 is a repetition of our preferred specification (column 2 of Table 2) for 
comparison. Column 2 constrains this specification to just private firms. Column 3 repeats column 1 without 
firm type controls. Column 4 uses individual city instead of political hierarchy fixed effects. Columns 5 and 6 
are parallels of columns 3 and 2 for column 4. 
  
Table 4. All firm sample for all years 
  
   
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. This table repeats our preferred specification (column 2 of Table 2) for the full time span of our data, i.e., 1998-
2007. This table shows us how bias in the capital markets varies over the 10-year span, to which we relate the changes in national leadership.
  
Table 5. Year pairwise correlations in annual city fixed effects (Table 4 specification) 
 
1998 1999 0 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
1998 1 
         1999 0.927 1 
        2000 0.884 0.947 1 
       2001 0.859 0.911 0.946 1 
      2002 0.814 0.862 0.902 0.921 1 
     2003 0.779 0.804 0.851 0.895 0.896 1 
    2004 0.648 0.665 0.699 0.746 0.795 0.854 1 
   2005 0.462 0.475 0.498 0.539 0.614 0.714 0.843 1 
  2006 0.336 0.352 0.393 0.442 0.507 0.635 0.747 0.901 1 





Table 6: How does varying city-level capital market favoritism relate to city growth, OLS  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
City fixed effects without firm type controls, 1998-1999 0.0263 -0.0289 -0.0688***   -0.0468** 
 (0.0202) (0.0218) (0.0248)   (0.0219) 
City fixed effects with firm type controls, 1998-1999    -0.0823***   
    (0.0259)   
City fixed effects without firm type controls, 2006-2007     -0.0801*** -0.0657*** 
     (0.0172) (0.0174) 
1995 share of emp by firms whose Y-M-labor costs <0  -0.1231** -0.1639*** -0.1454*** -0.0818* -0.1386** 
  (0.0555) (0.0582) (0.0485) (0.0441) (0.0577) 
1995 share of emp by LTD firms  0.4575*** 0.3223*** 0.3132*** 0.3283*** 0.3339*** 
  (0.0770) (0.0896) (0.0874) (0.0776) (0.0767) 
ln(prefecture population in 1982)   -0.0262** -0.0270** -0.0238** -0.0213* 
   (0.0117) (0.0114) (0.0115) (0.0119) 
Population change from 1982 to 1990   -0.049 -0.0415 -0.0493 -0.0375 
   (0.2074) (0.2045) (0.2274) (0.3048) 
ln(Distance to coast)   -0.0248*** -0.0241*** -0.0149*** -0.0215*** 
   (0.0056) (0.0055) (0.0039) (0.0054) 
1999 all road rays   0.0107*** 0.0114*** 0.0101*** 0.0097** 
   (0.0041) (0.0042) (0.0038) (0.0041) 
Constant 0.0652*** 0.0123 0.5124*** 0.5088*** 0.4325** 0.4195** 
 (0.0149) (0.0188) (0.1876) (0.1888) (0.1840) (0.2057) 
N 284 283 283 283 283 283 
R-squared 0.0109 0.1912 0.2824 0.286 0.2999 0.3151 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses.  
This table presents the OLS regression results on relating capital market favoritism to city population growth. Various city-level measures of 
capital market bias are tested with or without variables measuring other city characteristics that may simultaneously affect growth. 
  
	  
Table 7. Capital market favoritism (06-07 city fixed effects) on city growth, 
Historical employment composition of favored industries as IV, first-stage 
  (1) (2) 
Index of favored manufacturing industries in 2005 with 1995 weights 0.0051  
 
(0.015)  
Index of favored manufacturing industries in 2005 with 1998 weights 0.0098 
 
 (0.012) 
Other controls: Column 3 Table 6 Yes Yes 
N 283 283 
R-squared 0.022 0.022 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
	  
	   	  
  
	  
Table 8: Capital market favoritism (06-07 city fixed effects) on city growth, 
Political faction as IV 
  First stage Second stage 
  (1) (2) 




















 1995 share of emp by firms whose Y-M-labor costs <0 -0.1093 -0.0830* 
 
(0.1806) (0.0445) 
1995 share of emp by LTD firms 0.1382 0.3388*** 
 
(0.2211) (0.0821) 
ln(prefecture population in 1990) 0.2689 -0.0367 
 
(0.1664) (0.1619) 
ln(prefecture population in 1982) -0.18 0.0174 
 
(0.1567) (0.1561) 
ln(Distance to coast) -0.0098 -0.0148*** 
 
(0.0145) (0.0038) 
1999 all road rays -0.0219* 0.0092** 
 
(0.0118) (0.0042) 





Constant -1.3730*** 0.3593 
 
(0.5101) (0.2242) 
N 283 283 
R-squared 0.1363 0.2838 
KP F stat   8.8139 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
   





  Table 9: How levels results differ 
    (1) (2) 
  OLS IV 2nd Stage 









1995 share of emp by firms whose Y-M-labor costs <0 -0.108 -0.0193 
 
(0.1459) (0.1226) 
1995 share of emp by LTD firms 0.8402*** 0.8724*** 
 
(0.1816) (0.1733) 
ln(prefecture population in 1982) 0.9517*** 1.5734*** 
 
(0.0193) (0.3143) 
Population change from 1982 to 1990 1.5431*** -0.6081** 
 
(0.418) (0.3039) 
ln(Distance to coast) -0.0260*** -0.0146*** 
 
(0.01) (0.0056) 
1999 all road rays 0.0155** 0.0126* 
 
(0.0063) (0.0067) 
Constant 0.7719*** 0.5054 
 
(0.3201) (0.3610) 
N 283 283 
R-squared 0.9405 0.9426 
KP F stat   8.8139 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses for column 1. 
This table replicates Table 6 column 3 and Table 8 column 2, but with ln(prefecture population in 
2010) as the dependent variable to test the “long run outcome” effect of capital market favoritism on 
city size.  
  
Table 10: summary statistics of variables used in the city growth exercises 
  Mean Standard deviation Median 
Population growth 2000 - 2010 0.0506 0.1143 0.0439 
Ln(city population in 2010) 15.0812 0.6735 15.101 
City fixed effects without firm type controls, 1998-1999 -0.5498 0.4523 -0.6114 
City fixed effects with firm type controls, 1998-1999 -0.5197 0.3652 -0.5572 
City fixed effects without firm type controls, 2006-2007 -0.1315 0.3401 -0.1196 
1995 share of emp by firms whose Y-M-labor costs <0 0.2341 0.1189 0.2181 
1995 share of emp by LTD firms 0.1119 0.114 0.0778 
Ln(city population in 1982) 14.808 0.6972 14.8991 
Population change from 1982 to 1990 0.1298 0.1155 0.1168 
ln(Distance to coast) 5.3753 1.7275 5.9669 
1999 all road rays 2.8622 1.6986 3 
 
Online Appendix: The evolution of domestic capital markets and the banking sector in 
China 
The banking sector in China controls 70% of assets in the entire financial system, and the 
four large state-owned banks are the central pillars of the banking sector. Together they hold 45-
55% of banking sector assets in China (Wang, 2010; China Bank Regulatory Commission, 2012). 
In order to understand capital market issues, we discuss the banking sector’s evolution and 
current practices that lead to differential treatment toward firms of different ownership types and 
firms in different cities. We will also briefly review the limited alternatives for private enterprises 
in seeking credit outside the state controlled banking sector.  
1.1 Banking sector reform 
In 1978 as China embarked on its economic transformation, the People’s Bank of China (PBC) 
and rural credit cooperatives were the only financial institutions in China (Chen, 2010). In urban 
areas, enterprises were owned by government or collective bodies and investment decisions were 
made by the state. The PBC had no independent lending policies and primarily functioned to 
collect deposits (Chen, 2010). The first banking reform was to remove deposit-taking functions 
from the PBC and establish four state-owned banks2 to take over specific lines of business, and 
then later to designate the PBC as the central bank, supervising all other state-owned banks. The 
four state-owned banks were established as policy banks, so the lion’s share of lending went to 
finance projects that were sanctioned by planning committees and regional governments (Green, 
2010). In the mid-1990s, three policy banks3 were established to take over policy loans from the 
big four banks and to free them for more market-oriented businesses. However in this time period, 
the four state-owned banks did not progress to develop independent risk assessment mechanisms, 
since they were merely generally underwriters of projects that had been pre-determined by the 
state. By 1999, the four state-owned banks had inherited and accumulated large proportions non-
performing loans (NPL), which crippled their ability to develop market-oriented commercial 
business. At this point in preparation for later public listing and strategic investment and minority 
shareholding by foreign banks to add technical know-how and modern corporate governance 
(Green, 2010), the state removed RMB1.3939 trillion worth of NPLs from the balance sheets of 
the four banks, handing the NPLs over to specially established Asset Management Companies4 
(AMCs). Since then, the risk situation of the four banks has improved significantly (Wang, 2010), 
but political influence remains strong with two forms of discrimination of interest here.  
1.2 Sources of discrimination by firm ownership type 
Despite the on-going reform effort, private enterprises still face strongly discriminatory access to 
the formal financial system. According to an All China Federation of Industry and Commerce 
report (2010), it is very hard for private enterprises to get mid-term or long-term loans. Wei (2012) 
estimates that only 20% of private firms in Wenzhou (one of the centers of informal financing) 
can get loans from the formal system, with the rest relying solely on underground financing. And 
earlier we noted the disproportionate share of industrial enterprise debt held by state enterprises 
even in 2011. Why is there discrimination by firm type? 
Howson (2010) notes that, despite years of reform of state-owned banks, the Committee 
of the Chinese Communist Party retains the power to appoint the boards of directors and senior 
management of banks. The state’s interest is not communicated through shareholder’s meetings 																																								 																					
2 The Agriculture Bank of China took over lending business for the agricultural sector; the China 
Construction Bank for infrastructure finance; the Bank of China for foreign exchange management and the 
Industrial and Commercial Bank of China for commercial banking 
3 These were the China Development Bank (CDB), the Agricultural Development Bank (ADB) and the 
Export-Import Bank of China (China Exim Bank)) 
4 The Asset Management Companies are Huarong, Changcheng, Dongfang and Xinda. They were set up 
specifically to attend to the task of disposing of the NPLs of the state-owned banks (Wang, 2010).  
but via the firm-level Communist Party Committee. The Party Committee is not asking banks to 
act in the interest of shareholders, but in accordance with “stability”, “lawfulness”, and national 
“macroeconomic measures”.  Individuals appointed to bank senior management posts are 
personnel who have standing in the Communist Party hierarchy (Howson, 2010) and move 
between government and state bank corporate functions. As such, it is difficult for state owned 
banks to operate independently while facing pressure from different levels of government. Private 
enterprises have little leverage in this power politics. It creates an environment where private 
sector financial needs will be sidelined when state-owned enterprises and local governments are 
looking for money.  
Feyzioglu, Porter and Takats (2009) further argue that China’s existing interest rate 
control structure with a large gap between the ceiling on the deposit rate and the floor on the bank 
lending rate5 reduces the incentive for China’s state-owned banks to improve efficiency and risk 
assessment. In exercising credit control and in deciding which firms get how much credit, since 
politically and well-connected enterprises have better access and connections to bank officers and 
the bottom line is not profit maximization, credit control creates an environment where loan 
officers are more likely to channel funds to politically favored undertakings (Feyzioglu, Porter 
and Takáts, 2009). Moreover the whole structure tends to breed corruption in the banking sector 
(Nan and Meng, 2009).6   
Finally, the standard for evaluating credit ratings is determined by the headquarters in 
Beijing of the banks in China; each bank imposes a unified standard on all branches across the 
country. Enterprises that do not reach a certain credit rating standard do not qualify for loans 
(Chen, 2010). However, many standards were set up according to the circumstances of the largest 
firms in major cities. Smaller enterprises often lack the resources to meet the formal standards for 
preparation of accounting and auditing documents, even though they may provide higher growth 
potential than large state-owned firms.  
1.3 Discrimination over space 
The first aspect of discrimination across space concerns the urban versus rural sector. Chen (2010) 
argues that the commercialization of state-owned banks led to the fall of rural financing for rural, 
town and village enterprises (TVE’s). The “Law on Commercial banks of the People’s Republic 
of China” passed in 1995 set up stringent requirements on collaterals and guarantees. State-owned 
commercial banks can extend banking credit only on the basis of clearly defined assets (Chen, 
2010), usually land and buildings (Cousin 2006)7. The Collateral Law forbids rural land from 
being mortgaged, so rural enterprises and households cannot collateralize their most important 
asset to get credit from the banking sector (Chen, 2010). Beyond the evolving TVE sector, more 
generally, county-level branches of state-owned commercial banks do not have the power to issue 
loans (Chen, 2010). Since state enterprises disproportionally concentrate in big cities, private 
enterprises in smaller cities and rural enterprises suffer relative credit shortage.  
In the paper we focus initially on discrimination across cities of different political 
significance, but then generalize to all cities. We already observed the imbalance in bank loans 
going to entities in provincial capitals and provincial level cities, relative to their contribution to 
GDP. Liu (2007) notes that after the establishment of China’s commercial banking system, bank 																																								 																					
5 As for June 2012, the Yearly Current Deposit Baseline Rate was 0.35%, while the Yearly 6-month Loan 
Baseline Rate was 5.6% (the People’s Bank of China, 2012).   
6 All this is over and above the incentive to focus on bigger loans to spread the fixed costs in making a loan. 
The costs include information costs and supervision costs. Information costs include resources invested on 
researching a firm’s creditability and the costs of Non-Performing Loans due to insufficient information 
before lending. Supervision costs include the costs of supervising both lending enterprises and bank loan 
officers (Yin, Weng and Liang, 2008).  
7 Moveable assets back only 4% of commercial loans; inventory and receivables cannot be collateralized 
under Chinese Security Law (WB-PBOC Report, 2006). 
lending concentrated not just on China’s state-owned enterprises, but also major cities. One issue 
is that commercial banks in China have cautiously retrenched credit-extending authority from 
their local branches (Liu, 2007). Bank branches below provincial level are limited in their ability 
to extend credit to new clients and new investment projects. In general one would expect that 
firms in provincial level cities and provincial capitals have a closer relationship to provincial level 
branches where most of the credit extending power rests, than their counterparts in cities lower in 
the political hierarchy. Later we will argue that issues of favoritism are more widespread and may 
for example be related to the political influence and connections of local party secretaries and 
provincial leader attempting to garner credit for enterprises in their cities, or to national programs 
aimed at expansion of particular industries (through better access to credit), in which some cities 
are more specialized. 
 1.4 Alternatives for private firms 
The private sector in China depends on informal financing on different degrees in different places 
to meet their investment needs (Tsai 2002, Allen, Qian and Qian 2005, Linton 2006).  Farrell et al. 
(2006) notes that alternative financial sources could represent up to a quarter of total bank 
deposits in China; and Tsai (2002) claims that at least one quarter of all financial transactions are 
done through the informal system. Unlike formal financial intermediaries, informal lenders 
require no or very lenient collateral, charge very high interest rate, and reply on alternative 
enforcement measures that usually involve reputation or coercion (Allen, Qian and Qian, 2008). 
Ayyagari, Demirguc-Kunt & Maksimovic (2010) argue that Chinese private enterprises which 
have access to bank loans grow faster than similar firms without bank financing. They argue that 
the monitoring and enforcement mechanisms from the informal sector are ill equipped to scale up 
and serve the higher end of the market. Hence informal financing is not a sufficient substitute for 
formal financing, and it is increasingly the case as the size of Chinese economy grows. Firms, 
especially private firms, face sub-optimal growth potential when they are denied access to the 
formal financial system. To the extent this lack of credit varies across cities that affects city 
growth potential. 
In principle, private firms could turn to equity markets. However in China, the banking 
sector dwarfs its equity market and bond market, in terms of both market capitalization and total 
value traded (Ayyagari, Demirguc-Kunt & Maksimovic, 2010; Naughton, 2007). The equity 
market is a vehicle for state-owned enterprise semi-privatization rather than a level playing field 
for all firms to raise capital. Furthermore, the process of capital market listing is largely 
controlled by the government (Wang, Xu and Zhu, 2004). Durnev et al. (2004) argues that China 
has one of the worst performing equity markets in the world. Highly synchronous returns in the 
market are the consequences of weak property rights, corporate opacity and rent seeking. China’s 
corporate bond market is undeveloped too, crippled by excessive government regulation, the lack 
of institutional investors and credit rating agencies to set the price accurately (Ayyagari, 
Demirguc-Kunt & Maksimovic, 2010).   			
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